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Abstract 
This article examines and assesses the influence of political factors on the 
effectiveness of pursuing fiscal policy. These factors usually cause and maintain 
a high budget deficit and public debt. Moreover, the problems of influence of 
fiscal rules on increased effectiveness of the pursued fiscal policy have been 
discussed. The fiscal rules are to assure macroeconomic stability in economy 
and improve credibility of the pursued fiscal policy by reducing the deficit, 
government spending, and public debt. Examples of applicable fiscal rules in the 
EU and Poland are presented and an attempt is made to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these rules in the process of consolidation of public finances.  
1. Introduction 
In recent years one can observe an increasing interest of economic 
literature in fiscal policy and its impact on the economic activity. One of the 
main reasons for this interest is the fact that indicators of public debt-to-GDP 
ratio, caused by a long-lasting budgetary deficit have increased over the last 
several decades in many developed countries. In recent years this situation has 
dramatically deteriorated due to the global financial crisis, which turned out to 
be acute for the economies of many countries. Currently, deterioration of public 
finances seems to be the biggest threat to global finance. 
It seems that one of the reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that 
many countries fail to pursue responsible fiscal policy. The responsible policy is 
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one that stabilizes public finances in the medium and long run, by correcting 
inconsistent budget policy over time and by reducing predisposition to create 
deficit resulting from the influence of external factors on fiscal policy. The 
responsible fiscal policy results in increased reliability and transparency of fiscal 
policy and consequently increased macroeconomic stability and long-term fiscal 
stability which in turn improves investors’ confidence in the economy and 
promotes economic growth (European Commission 2010).  
It should be emphasized that the difficulties in implementing responsible 
fiscal policy may result not only from economic factors (e.g., economic 
recession), but may also result from political reasons. It is believed that 
politicians tend to use the power they exercise in order to pursue their own 
interests. In order to achieve their goals they use fiscal policy, thereby it often 
becomes irresponsible. This paper aims to analyze and assess political factors 
which hinder the efficiency of fiscal policy and generate high and permanent 
budget deficit and public debt. Moreover, the issue of the impact of fiscal rules 
on the increase in the effectiveness of fiscal policy has been mentioned. The 
paper ends with conclusions. 
2. Factors impeding the pursuance of effective fiscal policy 
Liquidity constraints and polarization of social preferences 
One of the factors that may induce pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy may be 
the access to external financing sources under different economic conditions. 
This is especially true in the case of developing countries, whose liquidity 
during stagnation/recession is significantly smaller due to lower reliability of 
these countries (as compared to the developed and economically stable 
countries), or these countries are offered high-interest loans. Consequently, the 
developing countries must reduce spending and cannot excessively increase the 
budget deficit. The situation changes during booms when it is easier to borrow 
money, resulting in increased borrowing and increased spending. Therefore, as  
a result of limited access to international financial markets in times of recession, 
the developing countries are somehow forced to conduct pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy (Gavin, Perotti, 1997; Catao, Sutton, 2002; Kaminsky, Reinhard, Vegh, 
2004). 
One of the latest hypotheses explaining the reasons of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy is a hypothesis about the social polarization of preferences resulting from 
social income inequality (Woo 2006). The strong polarization of social 
preferences can make it hard for politicians to pursue and implement optimal 
economic policy on the grounds that they represent the interests of different 
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social groups. The tendency of different social groups to put pressure on 
politicians is particularly strong in the period of economic expansion, when 
increased budget revenues increase the likelihood of meeting the specific 
demands. In this case, the pressure exerted by various social groups on 
politicians is such that they will make political decisions which are rational from 
the perspective of one social group, but inefficient in terms of economy and 
society as a whole. 
Conflict of interests (budget deficit as a strategic variable) 
In a situation of conflict of interest between political parties, politicians 
use budget deficit as an instrument of their strategy aimed at preventing or at 
least impeding the takeover of power by political parties with different 
preferences in regard to shape of fiscal policy. The ruling parties may tend to use 
the deficit as a tool with which potential successor will encounter limitations and 
difficulties in pursuing economic policy. This argument is based on the fact that 
the current budget deficit causes future costs in the form of lower spending 
and/or higher tax burden. 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) present a model in which politicians have 
different preferences as to the structure of budget expenditure. The ruling party 
which fears losing power to the opposition tends to maintain excessive budget 
deficit and to make such expenses, that they prefer. If the party actually loses 
power, the costs of the budget deficit in the form of future spending cuts will 
affect its successors in the sense that they will have to spend less on objectives 
they prefer, and which had not been preferred by the party which lost power. In 
this model, the budget deficit grows when the probability of losing power by the 
ruling party increases. Moreover, the deficit increases along with polarization of 
political parties, because the higher the polarization, the more disparate are the 
objectives and preferences of each party. 
A common-pool resource problem 
An important factor that makes it difficult to pursue a good fiscal policy is 
a common pool problem. A lot of public spending is targeted to specific groups 
of voters, while it is financed by all voters (taxes). So we are dealing with 
redistribution of financial resources, because often those who benefit from 
certain government spending are not those who pay for. In addition, a group of 
people who pay (all taxpayers) is larger than the group of beneficiaries. 
Consequently, there is a difference between the benefit of a group of 
beneficiaries and the benefit of general public. Politicians tend to over-estimate 
the social benefits of a particular fiscal policy because they see general benefits 
for the social groups whose interests they represent, and only a part of the costs 
in the form of taxes paid by these groups. The result is a common pool problem, 
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which leads to an increase in budgetary expenditures, especially those which 
provide local benefits (Von Hagen 2005b). 
Therefore, the varied interests of different groups of voters may become  
a cause of excessive spending and consequently, of excessive budget deficit. The 
problem arises when politicians who are making decisions regarding the budget 
represent different regions of the country and want to truly represent the interests 
of their constituents. In such a situation the politicians will be interested in the 
implementation of these projects financed by the budget, whose benefits accrue 
to the region, but the costs are incurred by all the voters (taxpayers). 
Consequently, the particular region of the country absorbs all the benefits of the 
expenditure incurred by the budget, but only part of the costs. Subsequently, 
there is a “surplus supply” of government projects directed to those regions 
whose interests are most strongly represented by political parties. Therefore, the 
increase in spending and, consequently, in deficit is the greater, the more regions 
of the country are represented in the parliament (the government), and thus the 
greater is the geographical fragmentation (polarization) of the government 
(Działo 2009). 
The agency problem and asymmetry of information 
The agency problem occurs when one entity (the principal) hires another 
(agent or contractor) to pursue a specific task assigned by the principal. As  
a rule, however, the agent who implements assigned tasks, is not only guided by 
the good of the principal, but pursues his own interests, often different from the 
interests of the principal. 
In the context of fiscal policy, the voters are principals and politicians are 
contractors, but only the latter have full information about activities they 
perform. As a result, fiscal policy becomes sub-optimal, since the decisions 
taken by politicians often do not have a direct relation with the economy and are 
intended to “please” voters. 
Voters do not have full information about the activities of politicians, but 
are aware that government officials are corrupt to some degree and appropriate 
part of tax revenues to pay the so-called political rent, i.e. that is to finance their 
private interests. Therefore, during booms, the voters demand greater utility for 
themselves (e.g. in the form of lower taxes or higher quality and / or more public 
goods). This in turn forces the government to increase government spending to 
finance the production of public goods. In this way, voters are somehow forcing 
the government to pursue pro-cyclical fiscal policy, demonstrated by lowering 
taxes, increasing budget expenditure, and increasing the public debt when the 
economy is in the boom (Alesina, Tabellini, 2005). 
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3. The main types of fiscal rules  
To constrain the freedom of politicians in shaping fiscal policy fiscal rules 
are often introduced, that is quantitative constraints of the deficit, government 
spending and public debt, which are usually legitimated by constitutional 
regulations or related acts of law1. Consequently, the fiscal rules are to ensure 
macroeconomic stability in the economy and improve the credibility of fiscal 
policy and reduce excessive government deficits. The purpose of the rules is also 
to maintain the stability of adopted fiscal policy in the long run, as well as to 
reduce the negative externalities of independent fiscal policies pursued by the 
countries belonging to a specific federation of countries (e.g. EU countries). 
Fiscal rules are usually classified in three groups: 
• Deficit rules 
• Expenditure rules 
• Public debt rules2 
The deficit rules are in the form of limits, which the deficit cannot exceed 
in the fiscal year. A special type of deficit rule is a balanced budget rule, which 
for a long time has been the most popular and in fact the only applicable rule of 
fiscal policy. As set out by his rule, the total state budget revenues in a given 
fiscal period must be equal to the total expenditure, while the fiscal period need 
not be identical with the calendar year (since it can be longer). This rule may 
also allow for a temporary deficit due to unusual circumstances (a strong 
recession, natural disasters, war). 
One of the modifications of the described deficit rule is the so-called 
golden rule. Application of the golden rule allows for the deficit only to finance 
investment spending, while balancing current expenditure3. Public debt is  
a financial source of investment spending. According to advocates of the golden 
rule, it provides a proper distribution of wealth between generations4. Investment 
expenditures create assets, which will greatly benefit future generations, so it is 
appropriate in this case, to burden these generations with costs in the form of 
public debt repayment. It should also be noted that it is important to precisely 
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define the current and investment expenditure in order to prevent possible 
abuses of the fiscal authorities, who may try to treat the part of current 
expenditures as investment (Działo 2009).  
One of the varieties of sustainable budget rule are also deficit limits. 
Frequently, they take a form of a regulation that over a certain time (fiscal 
period); the budget deficit should not exceed a certain fixed, border value, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. An example of such a rule is the deficit limit 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, according to which the deficit in the Member 
States should not exceed 3% of GDP. 
The expenditure rules make take various forms due to the considerable 
diversity of budget expenditure categories. The vast majority of these rules, 
however, concern the aggregate expenditure. Probably the most popular are 
spending growth limits, according to which government spending is to grow at  
a specified rate, regardless of the changes taking place on the revenue side of the 
budget. Expenditure rules may also concern particular types of expenditure and 
usually take the form of long-term limits imposed on various parts of budget 
spending. 
The public debt expenditure rules are fairly uniform and practically not 
subject to modification. They are based on imposition of limits on the total level 
of public debt as a ratio of debt to GDP. The best-known public debt rule is the 
one included in the Maastricht Treaty and repeated in the Stability and Growth 
Pact according to which the public debt of EU Member States must not exceed 
60% of GDP. A similar rule can be found in Poland and is enshrined in the 
Constitution. The ratio of public debt to GDP should not be higher than 60% of 
GDP. 
4. Advantages and disadvantages of fiscal rules - effective fiscal rules 
Each of the existing fiscal rules has advantages and disadvantages. In this 
context it is important to select rules used in a given country in such a way so as 
to use their advantages to the greatest extent and at the same time to try to 
minimize their disadvantages. The basic advantages of the fiscal rules include: 
• The rules help reduce the tendency for the deficit and improve the condition 
of public finance sector, especially when they have strong legitimacy and are 
supported by mechanisms enforcing their adherence to the rules; 
• The rules provide a market signal which increases the credibility of 
macroeconomic policy; 
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• The rules can help reduce the cost of raising capital through lower interest 
rates on bonds (which is the indirect effect of higher credibility of 
macroeconomic policy). 
The fiscal rules have also the following disadvantages: 
• Some rules result in reduced flexibility of fiscal policy (e.g. the budget 
deficit rules and public debt rules); 
• The rules can lead to reduction of budget expenditures at the expense of 
capital expenditure; 
• The rules may cause aspiration to “bypass” the rules by the so-called 
creative accounting, or development of extra-budgetary units to which 
budgetary funds would be transferred in order to spend these funds outside 
the central budget, etc.5.  
However, the rules usually combine the advantages and disadvantages; 
there is no rule that would be optimal. For example, the deficit rule based on the 
structural balance is flexible, sensitive to economic fluctuations, but complicated 
and not transparent (flexibility for the price of simplicity). The public debt rule 
is simple, transparent, but it is not enough sensitive to economic fluctuations and 
may contribute to the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy6. 
Therefore, it is extremely important to select fiscal rules that would help 
to implement effectively the objectives set. In this context, it seems that an 
effective fiscal rules should have the following characteristics: 
• The rules should be properly defined (a specific fiscal indicator, precise 
definition, rules of wide coverage with no exclusions which would reduce 
their effectiveness); 
• The rules should be characterized by simplicity and transparency; 
• The rules should be flexible (on the one hand sensitive to economic 
fluctuations but should also include escape clauses which allow actors to 
temporarily opt-out of the rule without leaving the rule entirely e.g. in the 
case of natural disasters; 
• The rules should be the most suitable for the objective it serves; 
• Conditions for enforcement of rules should be ensured; 
• The rules should be supported by a consensus. 
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5. International fiscal rules (European Union) 
Joining the Economic and Monetary Union required from the EU 
countries to fulfill fiscal criteria enshrined in the Protocol on the excessive 
deficits procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht 
Treaty), signed in 1992. The first criterion assumes that the budget deficit should 
not exceed 3% of GDP. Since this rule provides some exceptions, e.g. when  
a high deficit is being reduced in a permanent way and is clearly approaching the 
designated limit. It is allowed to exceed the limit when it was caused by a strong 
economic recession. The second criterion refers to the level of public debt and 
shows that the debt to GDP ratio should not exceed 60%. Also in this case there 
are exceptions, as long as the rate of debt reduction is strong7. Fiscal rules 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty were quite effective and in many EU 
countries resulted in a significant decrease in the deficit and debt. In 1993, the 
average deficit in the candidate countries to the euro zone was 5.5% of GDP, 
while in 1997 the average deficit amounted to only 2% of GDP. In 1999, all 
countries met the required criteria. 
It was only the global economic crisis that caused a sharp deterioration of 
budget balances in EU countries. However, many countries (including the four 
largest: Germany, France, Spain, and Italy) maintained budget deficits close to 
or higher than 3% of GDP even during relatively good economic conditions 
(before the financial crisis).  
Since the Maastricht Treaty has not defined what fiscal policy should be 
pursued by the EU countries belonging to the Monetary Union, in 1997, new 
fiscal rules were adopted, enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact. The Pact 
imposed on euro area countries the obligation to prepare annual stability plans 
and convergence programmes for countries outside the Eurozone. The programs 
include scenarios of changes in public finances for several years, and the so-
called medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). According to the objective, the 
target structural balance should be zero or positive (surplus or structural budget 
balance8) and the EU Council is required to monitor programs and make 
recommendations to take corrective measures in case of discrepancies between 
the actual state and the MTO. 
The growing budget deficits and debt in many countries, resulting from 
the recent economic crisis, led the European Commission to strengthen fiscal 
discipline by introducing changes to the Stability and Growth Pact and in the 
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national fiscal framework. The definition of “prudent fiscal policy,” was 
introduced, that is the policy when nominal growth rate of spending does not 
exceed or is less than the nominal rate of economic growth from the period of 
several years. A provision was also added that countries with high levels of debt 
or excessive economic imbalance should improve structural balance by more 
than 0.5% of GDP annually and the “minimum acceptable rate of public debt 
reduction to 60% of GDP” was defined. In relation to countries which do not 
comply with the applicable rules, the sanctions were introduced in the form of 
non-interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP, which is then after two years 
upgraded to a fine if the country at that time did not follow the rules. There is 
also a threat to suspend access to funds from the Cohesion Fund. The 
Commission also proposed to introduce the so-called European semester, the 
review and evaluation of the budgets of countries and their plans for fiscal 
reform ex ante, prior to their implementation, which will not only foster a better 
coordination of fiscal policy, but also establish a more effective supervision9. 
6. Fiscal rules used in Poland  
In Poland, the fiscal rules have been applied since 1997, when a provision 
on public debt appeared in the Constitution. According to the provision, “it is 
not permitted to contract loans nor provide guarantees and financial sureties, 
following which the public debt exceeds 3/5 of annual gross domestic 
product”10. The fiscal rule enshrined in the Polish Constitution, has the highest 
rank in the Polish legal system. This ensures a high efficiency of the rule, 
because even if the parliament adopts the budget law incompatible with  
a constitutional provision, such law will be put into question by the 
Constitutional Court11.  
Since 2004, Poland as a member of the European Union, is obliged to 
obey the rules enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty12. The legal status of these 
constraints is high, because they are superior to national law and very difficult 
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(almost impossible) to amend. This implies a potentially high effectiveness of 
fiscal rules enshrined in the framework of the EU law. In addition, it also implies 
the adoption of a widely used ESA’95 system of official statistics and the need 
to recognize the decisions of external entity (Eurostat) on controversial issues. In 
this way, the use of the so-called “creative accounting” is greatly limited which 
increases the effectiveness of internal fiscal rules, such as the constitutional rule. 
However, the rules of the deficit and debt may lead to pro-cyclical policy, 
especially when the indicator underlying the rule has not been adjusted for 
fluctuations in the business cycle. First, because the nominal debt growth 
depends on the size of the deficit, the deficit increases during the economic 
slowdown/recession following the operation of automatic stabilizers. Therefore, 
when the economy is growing at a slower pace, in nominal terms, the debt is 
growing faster. Second, in the case of the debt limit in relation to GDP, the pro-
cyclical effect results also from the operation of the denominator (the relation of 
public debt to GDP, mentioned above): with slower growth of GDP the same 
debt increase in nominal terms leads to a relatively high ratio of debt to GDP. 
Initially, when the debt level is lower than the limit, the restriction is almost 
imperceptible, which makes it possible to pursue a fairly expansive policy and 
may lead to an increased debt level. When due to the excessive deficit the debt 
will reach the debt limit, the fulfillment of the requirements of the rule results in 
the rapid increase of restrictiveness of fiscal policy. It is likely that this moment 
will fall in a phase of recession because then, the debt increase is the fastest. In 
such a case there is a need to reduce the deficit at a time when a more 
expansionary policy would be desirable. Therefore, the fiscal policy becomes 
pro-cyclical13.  
With effect from 1 January 2011, a new expenditure rule, the so-called 
discipline rule entered into force, by which the state budget expenditure is to 
increase every year up to the inflation rate plus 1 percentage point14. The rule 
will not, however, cover the so-called rigid budget expenditures, i.e. the 
expenditures enshrined in the Acts (today rigid expenditures account for 74% of 
the total expenditure), if these expenditures had been incurred before the 
expenditure rule was introduced. This applies also to the so-called general 
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subsidy paid from the budget to local governments or expenditures on defense, 
as well as pension and health contributions paid for those on parental and 
maternity leaves as well as for persons with disabilities (the new rigid 
expenditures will be covered by the rule). The restriction will not cover 
expenses, which are difficult to predict, such as public debt servicing costs, 
contributions to the EU budget and international organizations, expenses 
reimbursed from the EU budget. With the rule of expenditure, the budget is to 
save PLN 3 billion in 2011 and PLN 5.5 billion in 2012. Were the rule of 
expenditure in force until 2015, the total budget savings achieved by reducing 
the increase of expenditure would reach PLN 45 billion. This rule is applicable 
until Poland is exempted from the so-called excessive deficit procedure15.  
It seems that in Polish conditions, the rule of expenditure has the most 
advantages because of its simplicity and clarity, and also because it does not 
contribute to an increase in pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
7. Conclusions 
The considerations carried out in this article permit to draw the following 
conclusions: 
• In many countries, the fiscal policy is largely pro-cyclical. One reason for 
this situation may be a difficult access to external funding, especially in 
developing countries. During the period of stagnation/recession the 
developing countries have limited liquidity because of their relatively low 
reliability. As a result, they are usually forced to reduce spending and cannot 
excessively increase the budget deficit. Therefore, in times of recession, 
developing countries are in a sense forced to conduct pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy. 
• Another cause for pro-cyclical fiscal policy may be polarization of social 
preferences, resulting from unequal income distribution in society. 
Politicians represent various social groups, and the pressure exerted by 
various social groups on politicians may cause that they would make 
political decisions rational from the perspective of one social group, but 
inefficient in terms of economy and society as a whole. The pressure exerted 
on politicians is particularly strong during the period of economic expansion, 
when growing budget revenues increase the likelihood of implementing the 
requests of individual social groups. 
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• Conflicting interests between politicians of diverse preferences may give rise 
to excessive government deficits. When such a conflict exists between 
political parties, the politicians use the budget deficit as an instrument for 
their strategy aimed at preventing or at least impeding the acquisition of 
power by political parties which have different preferences with regard to 
the shape of fiscal policy. There may also be a common pool problem where 
the different groups of politicians/voters fighting for the use of budgetary 
funds induce the increase of the deficit. 
• Diversification of interests of particular groups of voters and the politicians 
representing them is an important reason for the emergence of excessive 
government deficit. Politicians tend to use a common pool (taxes) to finance 
the needs of their own (local) voters. As a result, the particular region of the 
country receives great benefits from budget expenditure, but bears only part 
of the cost. There is pressure to direct public resources to those regions that 
are most strongly represented by political parties. The increase in spending 
and the deficit are the bigger; the more regions of the country are 
represented in the government (parliament).  
• An important reason for pro-cyclical fiscal policy and excessive budget 
deficit is asymmetry of information and the agency problem. If voters do not 
believe politicians, suspecting them of corruption and grabbing political rent, 
they demand higher spending or tax cuts when the economy enters a phase 
of expansion. Otherwise, voters would be afraid that the profits from the 
healthy economy would end up mainly in the pockets of politicians. For the 
same reason voters do not allow for accumulation of financial assets 
generated during the period of expansion, they would rather have the 
government generate debt, which would force the government to use its 
funds to pay off the interest, instead of grabbing the political rent. This 
causes excessive growth of the budget deficit, public debt and the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy. 
• Many countries have quantitative fiscal rules mainly to improve the 
reliability of the pursued fiscal policy and reduce excessive government 
deficit. The most commonly used fiscal rules include the budget deficit, 
public debt, and expenditure rules. 
• Fiscal rules, if properly applied, can be an effective tool for fiscal 
consolidation. The effectiveness of the rules is largely dependent on the 
practical possibility of their non-compliance (“by-pass”). One can specify 
the conditions under which fiscal rules should demonstrate higher efficiency. 
Precisely formulated rules relating to the actual condition of the state budget 
and not to its predictions, and those that are legally authorized (enshrined in 
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the constitution) give a better chance for effective action in the form of 
lower budget expenditures and lower deficit. 
• The weakness of the rules is the fact that they constrain the flexibility of 
fiscal policy (in the case of the budget deficit and public debt rules) as well 
as certain possibilities of avoiding the rules by creation of extra-budgetary 
entities (e.g. earmarked funds) which spend public funds by bypassing the 
central budget. 
• The budget deficit and public debt rules used in Poland are simple and 
transparent, which can be regarded as their advantage. They have also high 
legal status. On the other hand, however, the major weakness of the rules is 
that they can lead to pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
• The expenditure rule, introduced in 2011, seems to be a good solution for the 
Polish public finances. It is also simple and transparent, like the fiscal rules, 
but does not have the drawbacks of the fiscal rules: the expenditure rule does 
not promote pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. Consequently, the expenditure 
rule may be one of the instruments giving rise to the gradual reduction of 
budget deficit and public debt. 
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REGUŁY FISKALNE A EFEKTYWNA POLITYKA FISKALNA 
 
Artykuł poddaje analizie i ocenie wpływ czynników politycznych na efektywność 
prowadzenia polityki fiskalnej. Czynniki te z reguły przyczyniają się do powstawania  
i utrzymywania wysokiego deficytu budżetowego i długu publicznego. Ponadto, 
poruszone zostały problemy wpływu reguł fiskalnych na zwiększenie skuteczności 
prowadzonej polityki fiskalnej. Reguły fiskalne poprzez ilościowe ograniczenie poziomu 
deficytu, wydatków rządowych lub długu publicznego mają zapewnić stabilność 
makroekonomiczną w gospodarce oraz poprawić wiarygodność prowadzonej polityki 
fiskalnej i redukcję nadmiernego deficytu budżetowego. Zaprezentowane zostały 
przykłady stosowanych reguł fiskalnych w UE i w Polsce oraz podjęta została próba 
oceny skuteczności tych reguł w procesie konsolidacji finansów publicznych. 
